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Thomas Ehrlich*
A good judge must be a master of the craft. He or she must be able to
comprehend the complexities of a problem in its entirety, make a tentative
judgment about its resolution, analyze each component part, and then fuse
the matter back into a coherent whole that will not only resolve the im-
mediate controversy but also provide guidance for the future. A great judge
is something more.
Chief Justice Donald R. Wright is a fine craftsman. His opinions are
marked by careful and impartial analysis of difficult issues and wise elabora-
tion of basic principles. But he is something more.
"Is this the kind of country we want to live in?" That question, reports
a friend of the former Chief Justice on the superior court bench, embodies
Chief Justice Wright's whole judicial philosophy. This could be a troubling
approach. Who is a judge to decide "the kind of country we want to live
in"? It is particularly troubling for one who began law study, as I did, in the
tradition of Learned Hand-a tradition of deep skepticism about the reach of
judicial power.
Chief Justice Wright is also a skeptical man. He realizes that the
California Supreme Court cannot reform society, that the pinions of any
court's legitimacy are fragile. But his skepticism goes to more than the
limits of judicial competence. He realizes that other parts of government are
also administered by human beings and that there are necessary limits to
their power. His concurring opinion in People v. Disbrow1 is illustrative.
Relying on the California Constitution, and notwithstanding the contrary
decision of the United States Supreme Court under the federal Constitution,
the court ruled that statements obtained from criminal defendants in viola-
tion of their Miranda v. Arizona2 rights could not be used for purposes of
impeachment. "Miranda," wrote Chief Justice Wright, "is still the law of
this land. I now recognize that rule is eviscerated when police officers can
ignore the duty to give warnings, or, as in the instant case, violate Miranda
. . .knowing full well that illegally obtained statements may be admissible
"'3
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1. 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 116, 545 P.2d 272, 282, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 370
(1976).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Chief Justice Wright joins his skepticism with a deep belief in the
inherent worth of the individual and the inherent promise of society to
improve itself. That combination produces a profound humanitarianism. A
well-known instance of those qualities is the Chief Justice's decision in
People v. Anderson,4 which held that capital punishment is impermissibly
cruel. Recall his closing words in that opinion: "Our conclusion that the
death penalty may no longer be exacted in California. . . is not grounded
in sympathy for those who would commit crimes of violence, but in concern
for the society that diminishes itself whenever it takes the life of one of its
members." 5 The concern of the Chief Justice for the individual and for
society is apparent in scores of his other decisions. They ensure that his
impact as a judge will be permanent. For example: People v. Duran,6 in
which he recognized the "affront to human dignity" and the "disrespect for
the entire judicial system" that was incident to the unjustified use of
physical restraints on criminal defendants at trial; People v. Bracamonte,
7
in which he held that "the integrity of an individual's person is a cherished
value of society" that cannot be violated by forced administration of an
emetic to obtain evidence of a crime; In re Lisa R .,8 in which he recognized
the right of a plaintiff to offer evidence that he was the natural father of a
minor child despite a statutory presumption to the contrary, and, quoting the
United States Supreme Court, stressed that the due process clause was
"designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from
overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy."9
Chief Justice Wright has also had a profound personal impact on the
lives of those who are lucky enough to know him as a bibliophile, art
collector, traveler, raconteur, and-most of all-as a friend. I came to
know him when I was at Stanford Law School. When he was appointed, a
deep and dangerous cynicism about government and the legal system per-
vaded many universities. This disillusionment was greatest at the time of
Watergate but it went far beyond that incident. I watched, listened, and
learned while Chief Justice Wright talked with students at Stanford and
elsewhere. As much as anyone I know, his presence, his kindness, and his
deep sense of humanitarianism enabled students and others to see what the
legal system can be. He has made us feel that there was, in fact, a chance
that the law would help realize a better society.
4. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).
5. Id. at 656, 493 P.2d at 899, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
6. 12 Cal. 3d 834, 545 P.2d 1322, 117 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1976).
7. 15 Cal. 3d 394, 540 P.2d 624, 124 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1975).
8. 13 Cal. 3d 636, 532 P.2d 123, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975).
9. Id. at 651, 532 P.2d at 133, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 485 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 656 (1972)).
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